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SUPREME

COURT OF CALIFORNIA.

Under Cal. Pol. Code, 325, which provides that a statute amended in
part is not repealed, but the unchanged portions are considered as having
been the law from the date of the enactment, and the amended portion as
dating from the amendment, the amendment of a statute does not have
the effect of repealing it, so that a subsequent amendment of the original
statute, without referring to the first amendment, is inoperative and void.
THE EFFECT OF-AN AMENDMENT UPON THE STATUTE AMENDED.

I. At common law, amendments of a*statute might be of
two kinds, either altering the provisions of the amended
statute by repealing or supplying them, or simply changing their application by declaring what construction should be
put upon them. In the latter case, there could of course be
no question of repeal; but in the former there was often a
question whether or not an amendment, which did not in terms
repeal the former act, was to be regarded as having that effect.
Such would undoubtedly be the case, as a general rule, where
an independent statute enacted provisions wholly at variance
with another of prior date; and there would seem to be strong
reasons why an amendment, 'equally irreconcilable with the
portion of the act amended, should have the same effect. But
on the other hand, the very fact that the act was designated as an
amendment would seem to point to the fact that it was intended by the legislature to form an integral part of the statute
amended, simply taking the place of the provisions which it
supplied; and in any case, it could only be a repeal as to the
I Reported in 36 Pac. Rep. 658.
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provisions which could not be reconciled. Accordingly, the
general rule is, that an amendment does not repeal the portion
of the amended statute which it supplies, but simply takes its
place, and becomes a portion of the original act, with the same
effect, as to matters subsequent to its date, as if it had formed
a part of the original act at the time of its adoption: Dillon v.
Saloude, 68 Cal. 270; S. C., 9 Pac. Rep. 162; Basnett v.
Jacksonville, 19 Fla. 664; Blake v. Brackett, 47 Me. 28; Job
v. Harlan, 13 Ohio St. 485 ; Oshe v. State, 37 Ohio St. 494,
It is consequently to be read in connection with the other portions of the original act, and its construction is to be governed
by their provisions; and vice versa, they are thenceforth to be
interpreted with reference to it: Taylor v. Thorn, 29 Ohio St.
569. Thus, in Holbrook v.Nichols, 36 Ill. 161, the ninth section of the original act provided that deeds were to be acknowledged before certain specified officers (among whom notaries
were not included), and the sixteenth section enacted that
powers of attorney to sell real estate should be acknowledged
in the same manner as deeds. The amending act declared that
deeds might thenceforth be acknowledged and proved before a
notary public; and it was held that this extended to the sixteenth section of the original act, and that powers of attorney
to sell real estate might be acknowledged before a notary. So,
in McKibben v. Lester, 9 Ohio St. 627, where the amending
statute provided that " under the restrictions and limitations
herein provided, justices of the peace shall have . . .concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Common Pleas in any sum
over one hundred dollars and not exceeding three hundred
dollars," it was ruled that the words, "unaer -the restrictions
and limitations herein provided," must be taken to refer to the
restrictions and limitations contained in the original act, as it
stood after all amendments had been inserted in their proper
places; and-this construction.was approved and adopted in a
subsequent case arising under the same'acts : Job v. Harlan,
13 Ohio St. 485. Similarly, in Brigel v. Starbuck, 37 Ohio
St. 280, a statute passed in 1871, relating to appeals from the
probate court, authorized the taking of an appeal "from any
order, decision, or decree made under 'An Act regulating the
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mode of administering assignments in trust for the benefit of
creditors' . . . by any person against whom such order,
decisi6n, or decree shall be made, or who may be affected
thereby." The laws in reference to assignments for the benefit of creditors in force in 187 1, did not authorize the creditors
to select the assignee; but in 1874 an amendment to these
laws was passed, giving them the right to select one, subject to
the approval of the court, and it was held that the provisions
of the Appeal Act of 1871 were applicable to this act, and
that an appeal would lie under it, from an order of the court
approving the choice of an assignee by the creditors.
An amendment, therefore, is so far a part of the original
act, that the title of the original act covers it, and its own
title need not be looked to in order to determine its constitutionality. If the original act is constitutional, as regards the
title, so is the amendment, without regard to its title: Brandon
v.State, I6 Ind. 197; City of St. Louis v. Tiefel, 42 Mo. 59o;
State v. Ranson, 73 Mo. 78. And if a statute which has been
amended is repealed without referring to the amendment, the
amendment is nevertheless repealed also. They both stand or
fall together: Blake v. Brackett, 47 Me. 28; Greer v. State,
22 Tex. 588.
The rule that the repeal of a repealing act revives the act
repealed by the latter: i B. Com, 9o; Wheeler v. Roberts,
7 Cow. 536; Gale v. Mead, 4 Hill, io9; Brown v. Barry, 3 Dall.
365; Peo. v. Davis, 6 1Barb. (N.Y.), 456; Vandenburgh v. President, 66 N. Y. i; Com. v. Churchill, 2 Metc. i 18; Hastings
v. Aiken, i Gray, 163; Sutherland on Stat., § 168, and cases
cited; applies also to the case of the repeal of-an amendment,
and in such a case the provisions, of the original act become
effective again: Longlois v. Longlois, 48 Ind. 6o. In strict
language, however, this cannot be regarded 'as a revival, in
the sense in which it is used in the former instance. As we
have seen, the origifial act is not repealed, but merely suspended, and its provisions become effective, not by the operation of any rule of law, but merely from the fact that there is
no vis major, after the repeal of the amendment, to keep them
in the background. This rule has one qualification, however,
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that seems founded in reason and justice; and that is, that
when the amending statute merely repeats the language of the
original act, without change, a repeal of the amendment
operates, pro tanto, as a repeal of the original act, and there
is no revival: Moody v. Seaman, 46 Mich. 74. It is difficult
to see what valid objections can be urged against this doctrineThe sole purpose of statutory construction is to discover and
render effectual the intention of the legislature; and when
that body has repealed an amendment, couched in the language of the original act, the conclusion is inevitable, that
they meant to repeal, not merely the amending act, but the
provisions which it enacted. It requires no argument to prove
that in such a case to hold to the doctrine of revival would
simply be to defeat the will of the legislature.
II. The question has been very greatly complicated by the
constitutional provisions now in force in most, if not all,
of the United States, requiring the amended statute to
be set out in full, either expressly or by requiring that the
amendment state it to have been amended, -so as to read as
follows." Such a provision, of course, makes a material
difference in the effect of an amendment. Without such a
requirement, an amendment supplies no more of the original
act than is inconsistent with it; while with such a provision,
the omission of any part of the original act is tantamount to
.a repeal. Accordingly, it is the rule that under such a
constitutional requirement any provision of the original act,
not appearing in the amendment, is, if within its scope, ipso
.facto repealed: State v. Andrews, 20 Tex. 230; State v.
Ingersoll, 17 Wis. 631; Goodno v. Oslkosh, 31 Wis. 127.
But, although an amendment has this effect as to omitted
provisions, the amended statute is nevertheless not to be
regarded, as to the provisions retained, as repealed and eo
flatu re-enacted. It is rather to be held as simply continuing,
and the amendment, as at common law, to become incorporated with it: Ely v. Holton, 15 N. Y. 595; Moore v.
Mausert, 49 N. Y. 332; aff. S. C., "5 Lans. (N. Y.) 173;
Burwell v.Tullis, 12 Minn. 572; Alexander v. State, 9 Ind. 337.
This is very lucidly stated by Philips, P. J., in Kamerick v.
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Castleman, 21 Mo. App. 587: "I understand the rule of construction in this respect to be that where a section of a statute
is amended, and the amendment is in -such terms that it takes
the place of such section, the statute in which the original
section stood, as to future acts, is to be regarded as if the
amended section was incorporated therein. So much so is
this the rule that, if by an act, subsequent to the amendatory
act, the section of the original statute be repealed, the
amendment which stood in its stead is also thereby
repealed.

.

.
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And this is so, although the amendment

declares that the section is amended 'so as to read as
follows."'
The language of the court, in Gordon v. Peo.,
44 Mich. 485, is even more to the point. "The constitutional provision requiring amendments to be made by setting
out the whole section as amended was not intended to make
any different rule as to the effect of such amendments. So
far as the section is changed it must receive a new operation,
but so far as it is not changed it would be dangerous to hold
that the merely nominal re-enactment should have the effect of
disturbing the whole body of statutes in papi materia which
had been passed since its first enactment. There must be
something in the nature of the new legislation to show such
an intent with reasonable clearness before an implied repeal
ran be recognized." In some States, however, the question is
settled by constitutional provisions. In Alabama, for instance,
the constitution declares that the section or sections amended
shall be repealed: Wilkinson v. Ketler, 59 Ala. 306; approved
in State v. Warford, 84 Ala. 15; S. C., 3 So. Rep. 911. And
in California the Political Code enacts that the amendment of a
statute shall not have the effect of repealing it: Fletcher v.
Prather, the principal case (Cal.), 36 Pac. Rep. 658.
In most other respects the effect of an amendment under
the constitutional provision that it "read as follows" is the
same as at common law. Thus a repeal of the original act
repeals the amendment: Kamerick v. Castleman, 21 Mo. App.
587; but the repeal of an amendment does not revive the
original act. This necessarily follows from the nature of the
case; for the omitted provisions being already repealed by

UPON THE STATUTE AMENDED.

the amendment, the repeal of the amendment leaves nothing
to be revived. The whole statute becomes merged in the
,amendment, and they fall together: Peo. v. Supervisors, 67
N. Y. IO9. In Wisconsin, this is by statute expressly declared
tobetheeffect: Goodno v. Oshkosh, 31 Wis. 127; Rev.St.Wis.,
c. 5, S. 25, subd. 3.
There remains the very curious question whether, after a
statute has once been amended, an amendment of the original
act will repeal it. At common law, of course, no such question could arise, unless the provisions of the two amendments
were in pani wateria, and inconsistent with each other. So
long as any material was left to work over, amendments might
be passed ad libiturm, and all would stand. But with the advent
of the constitutional rule, repealing by implication everything
omitted in the amendment, there could no longer be anything
left to work over, and a second amendment, to be operative at
all, must of necessity repeal the first. Accordingly, the consensus of authority declares in favor of the repeal: Fletcher v.
Prather (Cal.), the principal case, 36 Pac. Rep. 658; Basnett
v. Jacksonville, 19 Fla. 664. When a section of the revised
statutes was repealed and re-enacted in a changed form, a
subsequent statute which in terms repealed and re-enacted the
original section in still another form, was held to be a repeal
of the section in its amended form, and to take the place of the
amended section as part of the revised statutes: State v.
Brewster, 39 Ohio St. 653. So in Com. v. Kenneson, 143
Mass. 418; S. C., 9 N. E. Rep. 761, there hhd been
an amendment passed in 1885, and another in I886, in
each case reading "section nine of 'chapter fifty-seven
of the public statutes is hereby amended so as to read as follows;" and then followed a sentence covering the whole
ground of the original section, and impliedly repealing the
preceding provisions. It was held that the intent of the legislature was plain that the first statute should take effect instead
of the original, and that the second should take effect instead
of the first. This is a necessary corollary of the doctrine
that the amendment takes the place of the original section;
for, that being the case, any reference to the corresponding
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portion of the original statute must be taken to refer to the
amendment.
This very obvious deduction seems to have wholly escaped
the notice of the court in Blakemore v. Dolan, 5o Ind. 194,
the only case holding a contrary doctrine to. that stated above,
where, though it was correctly ruled that the amendment
takes the place of the section amended, th-e decision went on
to say that a second amendment of that section was void, as
the section was no longer in existence; forgetting that to all
intents and purposes its'existence is continued in the amendment. "When a section in an existing law is amended in the
mode prescribed by the Constitution, it ceases to exist, and
the section as amended supersedes such original section, and
the section as amended becomes incorporated in and constitutes a part of the original Act; and the original section is as
effectually repealed and obliterated from the statute as if it
had been repealed by express words; and it is upon this
principle that it has been held that a section which has been
once amended cannot again be the subject of amendment, but
the section as amended must be amended:" Blakemore v.
Dolan, supra; Draper v. Falley, 33 Ind. 465; Board v.
Markle, 46 Ind. 96. This decision, however, as has been
shown, carries its refutation within itself, and needs no further
comment except to say that it stands alone, in opposition to
all the other authorities on the subject.
In striking contrast with the ,case last cited, it has been
held in Alabama, following out the two principles that the
intent of the legislature must govern, and that an amendment is incorporated with the original act, and becomes
identical with the section amended, that where the constitution expressly provides that an amended section shall be
repealed, an amendment to an act already amended, and
.therefore
opr
tanto repealed,"which does not refer to the first
amendment, nevertheless repeals it, in spite of the argument
that an amendment of a repealed act is a nullity: State v.
Warford, 84 Ala. 15; S. C., 3 So. Rep. 911.
S. P.Q.R.

